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The fundamental point to our argument is that public
policy performs multiple roles in a democracy, only one
of which relates to the utilitarian purposes of effectiveness
and efficiency that science and technology address.
Ideally, the various roles of policy are appropriately
balanced, given the context within which the policy
operates, and are all served.  In the case of water
resources, however, contending interests that justify
themselves with scientific and technical rationales have
come to dominate the policy arena, to the detriment of
deliberative democracy.  To restore balance, enlightened
scientists and other experts need to be more appreciative
of the importance of broad public discussion of issues and
more willing to forgo exclusive reliance on technical
answers.  In water policy we need less rather than more
science.  
POLICY HAS MULTIPLE ROLES
The argument begins with a consideration of the roles
public policy performs in a democracy.  First, public
policy should solve problems efficiently and effectively.
This is the role hydrologists, engineers, and systems
analysts find most familiar, and is the one also considered
central to the policy sciences, which is comprised of a
number of social science disciplines focusing on public
policy.  Policy is seen as instrumental in the achievement
of goals or the alleviation of problems.  Sufficient water
at a reasonable price must be delivered to serve human
needs.  Flood losses should be reduced.  Environmental
quality must be protected.  A quality drinking water
supply must be assured.  
In its role of problem solving, policy is expected to
involve a logical sequential process that begins with the
identification of a problem or goal, the identification of
alternatives for reaching it, selection of the optimal
alternative, implementation, evaluation, and redesign or
adjustment as needed.  Water science and technology sees
itself as playing a critical part at each of these stages.  It
provides a systematic way of setting priorities and action
agendas through monitoring of important indicators.  For
instance, water science can tell us the salinity levels
where salts in the Colorado River become a significant
problem. Causal analysis and systems monitoring can
help identify the priorities or the critical forces that must
be modified to reduce salinity levels.  Another example:
scientific data gathering and analysis can tell us whether
the salts in the Colorado River are from natural or human
sources and what strategies would reduce each of these
salts to specific levels at what cost.  Further analysis can
determine whether goals are reached and if not, what
might be done about it.  The test of a good policy is that
it achieves goals effectively and efficiently.
The primary actors in the utilitarian view of policy are
specialists and experts who have knowledge about the
subject matter.  Such specialists are located in
bureaucracies, universities, think tanks, and engineering
firms.  Often there is a professional network or
community that speaks the same jargon and has a
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common perception of the nature of problems (Smith
1993).  This is very much the case in water resources.
Those who have been involved in water resources for a
number of years know the extent to which we are a
community of people who know one another by their
work if not face to face.  A person can move from the
United States Geological Survey to a university where the
person may also serve as a consultant to an engineering
firm.
The utilitarian or science perspective greatly contributes
to the success of policy.  Policies must work to solve
problems or the legitimacy of the political regime is
threatened.  Consider the example of the Soviet Union
where mounting practical problems of poor economy and
degraded environment did much to undercut support for
the political system.  Dams must hold water; water from
water projects must be delivered to the designated places
or agencies that build and run projects are not likely to
survive.  Even so, the scientific perspective is at best a
partial view of what public policy in a democracy must
do.
The second role of policy relates to the policy process.
This perspective focuses on policy as a reflection of the
exercise of political power involving negotiation between
contending coalitions of interests.  Policies emerge from
contests in which people and interests have something to
gain or lose.  The history of the Central Arizona Project,
for example, can be portrayed as a geopolitical struggle
between people in the upper and lower basins, each group
desiring to secure sufficient cheap water for development
(Ingram 1992).  Economic and environmental interests
are also contenders, and much of the history of water
policy since 1970 can be written as the struggle between
those who profit from economic progress and those
associated with the environmental movement.  From this
perspective the business of policymaking is never
finished.  Each statute, executive order or regulation
marks a temporary balance among contending powers.
Good policies are those that enjoy widespread general
acceptance.  For instance, the 1972 Clean Water Act
would be viewed as very successful from this perspective
because the regulatory framework it set up (of standards
and pollution permits) has been generally accepted, even
though it may be terribly flawed from a scientific point of
view (Mann and Ingram 1984).  Certainly the experts on
the National Water Commission were highly critical in
their report which questioned whether water safe enough
to swim in everywhere was a reasonable goal and whether
across-the-board standards were wise given the enormous
variations in quality and uses of water.  Such criticisms
were completely ignored by the legislation’s chief
sponsor, Senator Edmund Muskie.  Along with interest
group leaders, elected officials are the primary actors in
the process of negotiation and bargaining.  Elected
leaders seek not just resolution of conflict but credit for
popular policy decisions.  Many analysts believe that the
1972 Clean Water Act would not be as strong as it is
except for Senator Muskie's presidential ambitions.
A third aspect of policy is to provide an arena and subject
matter for democratic deliberation through which citizens
are enlightened, informed, and participate in the search
for the public interest.  While articulated today by some
fairly abstract critical democratic theorists, this vision of
policy was strongly espoused at our nations founding by
statesmen like Thomas Jefferson who firmly believed that
the people themselves were capable of making decisions
that affected them (Ingram and Wallace 1996).  This
vision is also articulated in much of water policy,
particularly the history of irrigation.  Arthur Maas (1978)
has written that the community legislature and water
court in Valencia, Spain, are among the oldest democratic
institutions in the world, existing even before the British
parliament.  These institutions allow ordinary people to
make and enforce rules to ensure that water will serve
community interests (Mann and Anderson 1978).  Water
played a critical role in formulating community
consciousness and community self determination in the
building of the American west.  As the work of Michael
Meyer has demonstrated, white settlers copied much of
earlier Hispanic water law that allocated water above all
to serve human welfare, not just to satisfy individual
rights (Meyer 1984).  Moreover, the process of
collectively developing sources for water and distribution
systems, cleaning ditches and honoring rotation of water
use, reinforced the practice of democratic behavior.
Individuals learned that individual livelihood depended
on everyone restoring irrigation systems after storms.
They also deferred self-interest in favor of the collective
good by closing the gates to their irrigation canals when
their turn was up (Brown and Ingram 1987).
It is obvious to any reasonable observer that policy is
failing in its role as an enhancer of democratic
deliberation.  In recent surveys most people have said that
they distrust their governments more than any other
institution.  While many see government as an active
threat to their rights, others simply view the acts of
government as irrelevant to their lives.  Water policy, like
many other policies, is greeted with alienation, cynicism,
23
and disinterest.  Water users doubt that utilities can be
depended upon to deliver clean, safe water and to protect
the public interest over bureaucratic and special interests.
Consider the public's vote on proposition 200 in Tucson,
Arizona, which requires that Tucson domestic water users
stay on ground water for five more years even though this
proposition was opposed by most experts, Tucson Water,
and the Mayor.  Yet the initiative was approved by voters
after an acrimonious campaign in which the public utility
was accused of manipulating the public with false
information.
The fourth role of policy in a democracy is to serve
justice.  The relevant questions here pertain to fairness in
decision processes and allocation decisions and extend to
issues of generational impacts on the natural
environment.   Policies that appear to be effective and
efficient may have highly differential impacts on various
social groups, or may destroy the natural environment at
the cost of future generations.  Some groups are
disproportionately represented in favorable allocation
decisions and others are disproportionately
underrepresented.  Issues about justice have become so
prominent in environmental policy, for example, that an
entire field of study called “environmental justice” has
emerged.  Cost benefit studies often do not examine
differential impacts of policies in terms of race or
socioeconomic class.  Even the case studies of contending
coalitions often focus mainly on who won from among
those in contention, without recognition that some
interests may not even have been considered.  The history
of water rights and water allocation in the west shows the
systematic disadvantage of Indian tribes.   
Balancing these partially conflicting roles is essential to
good public policy.  Finding the correct balance requires
careful tradeoffs within the context of particular policies
at particular times.  When public policy in any area is
single minded in its purpose and pursues instrumental
rationality, political balance, democratic participation, or
equality to the exclusion of all else, policy undermines
rather than supports democracy.  Where imbalance
occurs, action needs to be taken to bring roles into better
balance.
WATER POLICY LACKS BALANCE
It is not difficult to find examples in water resources
where several roles have not been fulfilled, to the
detriment of good public policy.  Sol Resnick, the former
Director of the Arizona Water Resource Center, used to
tell a story about his experiences as a hydrologic advisor
in some developing country where the state of
deliberative democracy and sense of justice were quite
advanced but which was technologically backward.
Villagers, including almost all who were residents, met to
decide where to put a new well (Resnick, 1984).  They
debated the advantages of placement close to this house
or that and finally settled upon a site that everyone
accepted.  Once the decision was made, villagers were
completely committed to it despite Sol's efforts to explain
that the depth to ground water was far too great at that
particular place.  Eventually digging began and as Sol
predicted workers could reach only sand.  According to
Sol the villagers blamed him for the failure and not their
decisionmaking process that included a balancing of
interests and democratic deliberation but excluded
consideration of the utilitarian logic necessary to connect
users to dependable water supplies.  Later, accepting
reality, the well was successfully dug at the site proposed
by Sol!
The 1922 Colorado River Basin Compact represents a
political context in which interests were satisfied, but
which lacked important scientific information, was
inattentive to issues of justice, and did not provide for
democratic deliberation.  The delegates to each of the
basin states who met at Bishops Lodge outside Santa Fe
represented all of the powerful interests, but were
certainly not democratic decisionmakers.  They met
behind closed doors and carved up the Colorado River;
parceling it out among the states as if they both had the
power of mother nature and were omnipotent about the
public interest.  Their elite meetings were far from
democratic deliberations, and the interests of Native
Americans were poorly represented.  Further, their
science was flawed, and their assumption that the
Colorado River would dependably flow at more than 15
million acre feet a year was significantly off the mark.
The flawed policy that emerged has led to a sense of
injustice and prolonged conflict over who would bear
shortages  (Weatherford and Brown 1986).
Contemporary water policy is imbalanced in a different
way.  The kind of imbalance among policy roles can best
be described as dominance of political power, technically
legitimated.  That is, policy choices reflect political
competition among powerful interests that are legitimized
by appeals to scientific and technical arguments.
Interests, including bureaucratic interests, contend with
one another in a context where participants disguise their
concerns with scientific and technical arguments that
appear credible but which actually are chosen not on
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scientific grounds but instead because they serve specific
interests.  Elected leaders fear appearing at cross purposes
with experts on water.  They take positions depending
upon whether they can find experts who will give them
convincing technical rationales.  This kind of imbalance
leads to policies that are destructive to justice and to
deliberative democracy.  Further, such politics and policy
ultimately discredit science.
In water policy the roots of the impulse to disguise water
policy in technical terms can be traced to the progressive
era during which the power of expertise to fashion
policies was elevated above the politics of powerful
interests.  John Wesley Powell, for instance, contended
that the federal government and the Department of
Interior should create scientifically based water and land
policy for the West.  Earlier reclamation policy promised
to make the deserts and agrarian democracy bloom
through projects which were planned and constructed by
centralized, bureaucratic expertise.  As Samuel Hays'
1959 book about the progressive movement in natural
resources makes clear, local interest groups challenged
and often prevailed against centralized experts.  However,
the notion that there was a scientifically right way to
handle water resources became firmly imbedded in the
collective mind.  The prestige of scientific approaches to
water policy got a boost when the great dams constructed
in the pacific northwest and Boulder Canyon were able to
deliver flood control and cheap hydropower.  These
projects symbolized the ability of water science to solve
practical problems.
The linkage of science to government is reinforced by the
technically oriented missions provided to federal natural
resources agencies.  There is a natural affinity of science,
technology, and bureaucracy because of shared values,
such as a belief in hiring based on merit and
specialization rather than kinship, friendship, or
patronage.   Management specialists gradually are being
replaced by disciplinary specialists who have advanced
degrees in one or another scientific field.  Many scientists
have gained management skills that make them
comfortable in bureaucratic hierarchies.  Scientific
rationalizations provide a powerful legitimation to policy
proposals and actions emerging from agencies.  Scientists
and professionals have much stronger credentials than
generalist managers when it comes to knowing the right
answers.  Modern life tends to favor bureaucratic
organizations, and armed with scientific legitimacy, the
power of professionalized bureaucracy is truly formidable.
The clout of expertise has not been lost on interest
groups, including the environmental movement.  Scholars
have documented the trend toward environmental interest
groups hiring their own in-house scientists to provide the
best possible rationales for positions that they take, even
though those positions are taken mainly on grounds other
than science.  The tobacco companies hired their own in-
house researchers to counter the arguments of university
and government scientists and smoking causes lung
cancer.  Business and trade associations  engage their
own science experts to help them put the best scientific
face possible upon their activities.  This has spawned a
debate about which side can claim mainstream science
and which is junk science, as illustrated by the
advertisements in the New York Times sponsored by the
Union of Concerned Scientists in which they claim they
have brought sound science to the table while their
opponents have commissioned junk science (Union of
Concerned Scientists 1996).  While the two sets of
scientists in this debate are squarely at odds, they share
common scientific allegiance to policy as a utilitarian tool
as well as common background and credentials.
Similarly in the area of water resources, while there are
enormous differences of opinion about the particulars of
water policy within the community, there is general
agreement about what passes for acceptable knowledge
and evidence in the policy debate.  However much these
experts may differ on particulars, they are united on the
notion that water is a technical subject that requires
special study before anyone should venture to express an
opinion or form a conclusion.
Despite the veneer of science and scientific rationality,
the politics of interest, including professional,
bureaucratic, geographic, economic, and environmental
interests is clearly the driving force here.  Utilitarian
reasoning and science are brought in as very junior
partners in the combination.  In this context science is
more used than listened to.  That is, only those scientific
and technical arguments that support policy options
favorable to interests are made.  The unfettered
consideration of all possibilities does not take place.
Before we consider further the impacts on science,
however, let us first consider the consequences to policy
processes and content.
In interest dominated, technically justified water policy,
issues are socially constructed as technical questions that
only technicians can answer.  There is an old axiom in
politics that declares that whoever defines the issues wins
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the contest.  Most issues are subject to a variety of
constructions.  For instance, take the issue of crime.  It
can be constructed as a matter of the effectiveness and
efficiency of delivering safety to the public.  Under this
guise whether or not to patrol a neighborhood, strengthen
sanctions for crimes, or alter penal systems depend upon
whether crime is reduced and at what cost.  Alternatively,
crime can be constructed as a political issue in which
public officials who are soft on crime let criminals off and
coddle them while they are in jail.  The political issues
are whether one or another candidate or party has a better
record for effectively fighting crime.  Or, crime can be
constructed as a justice issue in which some social and
ethnic classes are treated differently by policy, are over
represented in the criminal justice system, and are more
likely to have practices in which their members engage
criminalized.
Water issues, particular those related to water quality,
tend to become defined narrowly and technically.
Contamination is described as parts per million of an
alphabet soup list of chemicals that only chemists
understand.  Possible health effects are discussed in terms
that communicate only with a toxicologist.  While the
debate sounds highly technical, most research scientists
view it as superficial.  Under such definition of issues, a
broad, hydrologic focus is absent.  The water is not seen
in systemic terms and the larger picture of past and
present development choices directly and indirectly
related to water availability and quality are excluded from
the debate.  Further, the sustainability of water systems
into the future is not usually part of the discussion.
Social construction of issues in narrow technical terms
also leaves out important social justice concerns.  There
is little focus on who fairness or on who wins and who
loses.  What industries will receive subsidized water
rates, how present users may have to pay for system
expansion to accommodate growth, and what may happen
to trees and other greenery as a result of water rate
changes are just some of the questions seldom discussed.
There is little explicit discussion of who holds the power
of decision in issues that are presented in heavily
technical terms, even though control clearly gravitates
toward experts.  Instead science is presented as if it were
politically neutral.  The technical nature of issue
construction eliminates real participation on the part of
the lay public.  If the public becomes any part of the issue
definition, it is to draw attention to how little the public
knows and how much it needs to be educated.
When issues are constructed technically, the resulting
legislation often contains policy designs that are
damaging to democratic deliberation.  While water
policies are supposed to lead to action, policies devote
many provisions to what experts like to do best; that is,
study, gather data, employ additional researchers and
technicians, plan, evaluate, and write reports.  Little
distinction is to be made between what is good for
professionals and other experts and what is good for the
public interest.  Experts prosper whether or not projects
are built and there seems to be endless calls for additional
study.
While policy experts have great confidence that, given the
proper support, they can find solutions to problems, they
display little confidence in street level agency officials or
ordinary people to take action.  This bias is reflected in
their choice of policy tools.  They prefer policy tools that
work automatically and do not depend upon modifying
human behavior through education or incentives.
Quantitative decision aids remove the need for
administrative judgement.  When population and
pollution reach certain action levels, local agencies are
supposed to invest in facilities to meet drinking water
standards rather than balance competing needs which
may include systems maintenance and public
information.  To solve pollution problems, the water
policy designers opt for new waste treatment
technologies.  More attention and money are directed at
technical solutions than to behavioral solutions that might
induce people to change their buying habits or to pollute
less.  Because people receive implicit messages through
their experience with policy, it is not surprising that most
people view water as an arcane subject too complex for
their involvement to be meaningful.  The kinds of rules
imbedded in policy are also significant.  Long range
planning rules require goals to be adopted and actions to
be determined that will not take effect for many years.
Only those who have a direct financial interest or a high
level of expertise are likely to express interest far in
advance.  While planning documents are useful to
professionals, they are often barriers to participation.
Advocacy science rather than normal science often occurs
in water policy and science itself becomes politicized
(Salter 1988).  Controversial agency actions require the
endorsement of scientific advisory committees which are
asked to certify the technical soundness of positions that
are often as much political as technical.  All the serious
contending interests, including government, have their
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own science advisors.  While these advisors hold real
credentials and share scientific values, the kind of science
they are asked to do is far from the idealized model.
While scientific investigation may take place in standard
laboratory or science settings, and scientists involved go
to great length to protect their reputations as free from
bias, the atmosphere is far from dispassionate.  The
usefulness of the conclusions of research to the sponsors
who may be regulators, regulated, or interest groups is at
the forefront.  There is not the open ended exploration of
natural phenomena characteristic of research science.
This kind of science almost never results in innovative or
surprising break through in understanding.  Further,
scientists are often pressured to provide conclusions they
are not ready to provide to audiences that have little
background to recognize good science.
Advocacy science has some pragmatic advantages to the
scientific establishment that must be mentioned.  The
demand for people with technical expertise is very high
and there are many jobs for graduates of university
programs that provide technical training.  There is a
fairly free flow of money for studies that are performed by
consultant groups and university professors.  Such
benefits come at a price which some believe is too great.
Sociologist Chandra Mukerki (1989) has written:
The process of giving the voice of science to the
state for its political ends is, in formal terms, the
opposite of ventriloquism.  Scientists do not send
their voices out to speak through the mouths of
mute government officials.  Government officials
extort the language of science and scientists’
analytic skills to do their political jobs.  Scientists
are made mute, except when politicians find their
voices useful.
While scientific and technical rationalizations provide
enormous power to the political interests that find them
beneficial, Mukerji is correct to conclude that individual
scientists and science as an intellectual enterprise are not
really advantaged.  The public gets the impression that
science can be bought when opposing sides line up their
advisers and expert witnesses.  The wonderful reputation
science once had for its ability to solve problems is badly
damaged.  Like everyone else, scientists are believed to be
mainly out for themselves.  Further, there is bound to be
a conservative bias to science that is done in the service
of legitimizing the advantage that the state or private
interests have over others.  Despite the vision scientists
have of themselves as independent, critical, and
innovative, in their role of legitimating policy beneficial
to powerful interests, they tend to be tools of the status
quo.
A MORE APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR SCIENCE 
What suggestions do we have towards a more appropriate
role for science in public policy? What can scientists do
to change their role in the politics of interests, and be
technically justified? Three possibilities that are different
but not mutually exclusive emerge.
Accept Their Political Role, and Improve Their
Negotiating Skills
Many believe it is impossible to treat technical issues as
if they are separate from those that involve interests and
values.  In her study of scientific advisory committees,
Sheila Jasanoff, a sociologist who argues this point of
view, found that successful advisory committees are
intimately involved in negotiation and bargaining not just
on what constitutes good science but many other political
matters.  When scientists are good at this job, they can
mediate political conflicts.  Jasanoff (1990) writes: 
Protected by the umbrella of expertise, advisory
committee members in fact are free to serve in
widely divergent professional capacities: as
technical consultants, educators,  policy advocates,
mediators, and even judges.  Though the purpose is
to address only technical issues, committee
meetings therefore serve as forums where scientific
as well as political conflicts can be simultaneously
negotiated.  When the process works, few
incentives remain for adversaries to deconstruct the
results or attack them as bad science (p.  124).
The implications for what kinds of credentials a scientist
should have to perform this role well are interesting. 
Being just a good scientist is far from sufficient.  The
most valued expert is one who can transcend disciplinary
boundaries, synthesize diverse perspective, and has a firm
understanding of the political role of science in public
policy.  This means that universities do a disservice to
science students and to the political process when they are
led to believe that science can be separated from politics
and that it is sufficient just to be technically proficient
while ignoring questions related to fairness, justice, and
other values.
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Perform Science for the Powerless and Under
Represented
The issues of what interests are served by science in
politics needs to be faced directly.  Since scientists in
water policy and similar areas that are technically
constructed are in fact deeply involved in decisions that
help some and hurt others, they have social obligations.
 The fact is that science is going to be used by the state
and powerful interests.  Science is likely even to be
distorted by these interests in ways favorable to them.
At the same time, there is a considerable experience of
science that challenges power by pointing out the
omissions, gaps, and misstatements in science
justifications.  Dorothy Nelkin (1992)  has chronicled the
number of cases in which science has been used by
community and environmental groups to challenge
authority in such areas as nuclear safety, registration of
pesticides, risks of food additives, and the like.  There is
a long tradition within water resources of the use of
science to question bureaucratic plans and special interest
schemes.  Consider the ways in which hydrology and
water science has been used to accomplish underdog
victories such as the defeat of dams in the Grand Canyon
and the passage of the Arizona Groundwater Act.
Other professionals regularly recognize that left to the
market, many would not be able to get access to their
skills.  To avoid the resulting inequities they donate a
portion of their time.  Consider the pro-bono work done
by lawyers or the charity clinics staffed by physicians.
Socially responsible scientists might well follow this
model.
Science in the service of justice, however, requires a
political sense that is alien to many scientists who do not
like to think they are in any way accountable for the ways
in which their research is used.  If scientists are to serve
democracy, they need to be better trained to understand
and question policymaking processes.
Exercise Influence to Restore Balance by Engaging the
Process of Democratic Deliberation
The most fundamental flaw in contemporary water policy
is that many value questions in which ordinary citizens
have a great interest, are being framed as technical
questions.  In consequence, the public discussion about
values that needs to occur in a democratic society does
not take place.  Water is a fundamental social resource,
and collective decisionmaking about its distribution and
protection is fundamental to building a sense of
community.  For every water resource question settled by
an elite, an important opportunity to improve the
deliberative process is foregone.
Technical issues need to be reinterpreted as human and
social issues, and the boundary of what constitutes a
technical question needs to be redrawn more narrowly.
While it is the primary role of politicians to perform this
function, in our present politics they often prefer to hide
behind the testimony of experts rather than deal with
conflicts.  In any case scientists have greater credibility to
more convincingly draw the boundaries between what
experts need to address and what should be public issues.
Unfortunately, it has been our experience that many water
specialists, often including professionals in engineering
consulting firms, are poor at drawing this distinction.
They encourage the public and client to believe they can
answer questions that are not subjects for experts.
Knowing what aspects of policy must be addressed by
deliberative processes, and not swept into the domain of
specialists, should come as part of graduate training and
continual practice of water resource scientists.  In the
long term only lively, meaningful discussion of human
values related to water can improve water policy.
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